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ANNOTATION:
Taxonomy of All Possible Worlds
A proposed Convergant Taxonomy for All Possible Worlds:
1.00 [apodeictics: rules and material physics]
. 99 [cataleptics: Bacteria, Archaea and their human equivalents]
.97 [eikasics: Euryarchaeota, to lobster analytics]
.94 [proegmenics: middle order Eukarya]
.90 [prohairetics: choice systems to vertebrate transitions]
.85 [kathekontics: synthetic adaptations as in pets: birds and lizards]
.79 [phronesics: social model of the Cape Buffalo]
.72 [pithanotics: probable behavior in primates]
.64 [spoudaics: the Ideal State in humanism.]
.55 [epideictics: assertions]
.45 [eristics: the Center Right]
.36 [sciolistics: flim-flam, nostrums and alternative medicine]
.28 [philosophastics: alternative physics of vampires and U.F.O.s]
.21 [thaumaturgics: unrestricted alternative physics of miracles]
.15 [anagogics: antinomian trance states]
.10 [paralogics: drug overdose]
.06 [paleophrenics: syndromes to psychotics]
.03 [acataleptics: true legal insanity to terminal states of life]
.01 [anapodeictics: anarchy or "ciao universe and rules as well"]
Author: Ian C. Dengler (cargan[ at ]delrio.com)
Date: Apr 21, 1999REPLY: "Theory of Theory" "Taxonomy of All Possible Worlds" "Theory of Everything" "Taxonomy of Metatheories" "Theory of Logic"
A complete taxonomy in logic should provide for both foundational categories and all their subdivisions as top-down, bottom-up or in some intermediate ordering. Terms for taxonomies of multiple divisions can be dated to the Classical period in both Greece and India. One possible array:
1.00 Apophantics Master Argument: devised by Diodorus Cronus c.284 BC from two premises: “Every
past truth is necessary” and “the impossible does not follow from the possible.” He concluded ”nothing is
possible which neither is nor will be true (see Apophaiscs .00)"
Apophansis: a categorical proposition or affirmation of something. Apophasis is negation.
Urmson, J. The Greek Philosophical Volcabulary.
The ultimate archai are the first premisses of knowledge or the ultimate principles upon which a
syllogism rests. Peters, F. E. Greek Philosophical Terms, A Historical Lexicon. New York
Arkhe has a great number of meanings, but they can all be seen to derive from the basic
meaning of a beginning or starting point: protos autos arkhen onomasas to hupokeimenon--
[Anaximander] having first called substance the first principle (Simplicius, Physics 150.23),Urmson, J.
The Greek Philosophical Volcabulary.
See prolegomenon, to say beforehand, or foretell, similar to protasis (“placed first”, in Aristotle’s
logic the proposition which is used as the prior premiss.)
See prolepsis, prolepseis=first principles, the anticipation, in adjectives or nouns, of the result of
the action of a verb, also, the positioning of a relative clause before its antecedent. Prolepsis, in the
Epicurean epistemology, however, refers to a universal judgment against which the truth of subsequent
apprehensions can be judged.Peters, F. E. Greek Philosophical Terms, A Historical Lexicon.
See procatalepsis, forestalling an argument, postlepsis=satkaryavada=the effect has being even before it
occurs, or "is born."
See prophasis: “exciting cause” which Hippocrates develops for the study of the origins of
disease. Thucydides employs the term to define the outbreak of war as a comcomitant of one phase of
the growth of empire.
See prosleptic syllogism, the non-conditional premise in the argument later called modus
ponens. Also defined as a potential, additional or hypothetical syllogism such that “To those that none of
A belongs, B belongs to all.” (Aristotle Prior Analytics, I, 5, 27 a.). Dumitriu, Anton History of Logic 9.2.5.
Properly the paradox of null.
Metaphysics, most generally, the philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution, and
structure of reality. It is broader in scope than science, e.g., physics and even cosmology (the science of
the nature, structure and origin of the universe as a whole), since one of its traditional concerns is the
existence of non-physical entities, e.g., God. It is also more fundamental, since it investigates questions
science does not address but the answers to which it presupposes. Are there, for instance, physical
objects at all, and does every event have a cause? Cambridge Dict Phil 1995: 489
Metaphysics is the most abstract and in some views ‘high-falutin’ part of philosophy, having to do
with the features of ultimate reality, what really exists and what it is that distinguishes that and makes it
possible. Oxford Companion to Philosophy 1995: 556
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.95 Apodeictics Premises are not valid or invalid but only true or false. Assertoric, what actually is,
rather than what is necessarily, always is, or what is only cognitively possible.
Aristotle and the Stoics struggled over the nature of necessity in logic and the types of necessity.
In logoi anapodeiktoi, things are simply true, not necessarily ture. On the other hand, Aristotle had the
notion of truth by necessity or logoi apodeiktikoi in which a demonstrated necessity of the facts had to be
part of the process. Apodeixis: pointing out, demonstration, proof. In Aristotelian methodology, apodeixis
is a syllogistic demonstration, that is, if the premises be true and primary (see Apophantics) this will lead
to truth. (Individuals are not subject to definition and hence undemonstrable.) Peters, F. E. Greek
Philosophical Terms, A Historical Lexicon. p 22:
Paul Thom. Apodeictic Ecthesis. Notre Dame J Form Log, 34(2), 193-208: 1993. A formal
interpretation is constructed for Aristotle’s apodeictic syllgistic, including the proofs by ecthesis. Ecthesis
is here taken to involve an appeal to singular prpositions. A system of singular propositions is
constructed, and the whole system of apodeictic syllogisms is based on it. On the basis of this reduction,
it is argued that 1) the ‘necessarily’ in Aristotle’s apodeictic propositions is, in the first instance, a de re
predicate-modifier, 2) Aristotle’s system is not a modal logic in the modern sense, 3) an extensionalist
reading can be given of Aristotle’s apodeictic syllogistic, 4) the model syllogistic formalizes some, but not
all, aspects of Aristotelian metaphysics.
.4408 The modes: apodictics defines what must occur, assertorics what might well happen, and a
problematic condition is what we are experiencing now. See .4991
By classical logic we mean that there is a single negation, and so the calculus is Yetter-like as
opposed to Abrusci-like. The correctness criterion is straightforward, the principal observation being that
the tensor-par pairing observed by Moortgat can be deduced from the structure of the axiom links.
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.90 Aisthesics [Ephemeromorph. A general name for the lowest forms of life, which are not definately
either animal or vegetable.]
In the Epicurean epistemology there was one ultimate criterion of truth, sensation (aisthesis, see
also aletheia). Used also as an equivalent of doxa, opinion, and inferior grade of cognition as in
Xenophanes, or Parmenides (fr.8, lines 50-61). Peters, F. E. Greek Philosophical Terms, A Historical
Lexicon.
Mnesarchus (c. 170-88 BCE), of Athens. Stoic philosopher. In psychology, he, like Panaetius,
denied that language (to phônêtikon) and the procreative faculty (to spermatikon) were independent parts
of the soul, and he reinscribed them, along with sensory perception, in the sphere of the aisthêtikon as
opposed to the logikon. He employed a distinction between kata to idios poion and kat’ ousian poion and
located in pneuma the prôtê ousia (primary substance) of the universe. Zeyl. Ency Class Phil: 349
Croce’s philosophy originates from his conception of aesthetics. Central to his aesthetics is his
view of intuition, which evolved through various stages during his career. He regards aesthetic
experience as a primitive type of cognition. Cambridge Dict. Phil 1995: 171
See also catalepsics, eucatalepsics, the latter used by Bacon to designate methodological doubt
and resolution: “Nos vero non acatalepsiam, sed eucatalepsiam meditamur.” Nov. Org., I, 126
See “katamnesia” (cataleptics):Nous avons voulu désigner par le mot nouveau de “katamnèse”
l’élan de conscience (pour reprendre une expression bergsonienne), qui nous porte á prendre conscience
du propre passé ainsi que du propre avenir du présent lui-même, par opposition aussi bien au mot de
“paramnésie”--que Bergson n’utilise pas, mais qui peut signifier l’illusion du déjà-vu (celle-là même que
Bergson analyse)--qu’à celui d’ “anamnèse”, qui signifie, lui, l’évocation volontaire par quelqu”un de son
passé. Alain Vinson. Paramnésie et Katamnésie. Archives de Philosophie 53, 1990, 3-29
Victor A. Grauer. Toward a Unified Theory of the Arts Semiotica (vol. 94-3/4), 1993, pp. 233-252.
Semiotics of aesthetic (not "aesthetics") as a fully independent "logic" of sensory experience. The model
is an Hegelian opposition of opposed but complementary principles, the "positive" field of unifying
semiosis, and the disjunctive "antactic" or "negative" field.
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.85 Eikasics used by Plato in his simile of the divided line in the Republic. The precise meaning of
eikasia is much disputed, but it seems to be the attempt to gauge the nature of objects from awareness
of their images alone. Urmson, J. The Greek Philosophical Volcabulary.
“And there is Polus, who has schools of diplasiology(diplo=dual), asio=owl), and gnomology, and
eikonology.” Phaedrus, 267
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.80 Proegmenics proegmenon: preferred. See proagein.Urmson, J. The Greek Philosophical
Volcabulary.
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.75 Prohairetics proaireisthai, proairesis=choice. Urmson, J. The Greek Philosophical Volcabulary.
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.70 Pithanotics defines the notion of “experimental” praxis or plausible best judgment. Carneades. See
Sextus Empiricus. math vii, 158, Pyrrh Iss 7-229. Peters, F. E. Greek Philosophical Terms, A Historical
Lexicon. p. 3. Also pithiatics, pitiatics, or “suggestion” as an equivalent to psychotherapy. Babinski and
Dagnan. Emotion et hysterie. Journal de Psychologie, mars 1912, p. 118.
Probabilism is the idea that rational certainty about reality is restricted, therefore pragmaticism
is only a probable judgment: pithanê phantasia are “convincing impressions” for rational choice in the
absence of any strict citerion of truth. Zeyl. Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy 1997: 121
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.65 Hypolepsics judgment. See doxa, noesis. Peters, F. E. Greek Philosophical Terms, A Historical
Lexicon
See Joachim Ritter, ed., Historisches Woerterbuch der Philosophie. Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe &
Co. 1984: term not found in Plato, for Aristotle a both theoretical and practical sense of judgment.
Implied is the notion that lower animals cannot or do not possess this kind of reasoning ability.
Cleverness is included.
Extensive research suggests nobody knows why the cheetah is the only big cat that so seldom, if
ever, gets lured into a trap.
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.60 Phronimics. Aristotle’s theory of phronimos--the man of practical wisdom. The phronimos is
capable of deliberating not just about specific goods but about “what sorts of things conduce to the good
life in general.” And he seems to suggest that if we want to say what sorts of things conduce to the good
life in gneral, we will not get very far if we try to define these in the abstract. Rather we will be guided by
what the phronimos would choose. For Aristotle the widsom of the phronimos can be seen as a model for
political activity: “Political and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but their essence is not the
same.” Phronimos eis hupodematon ergasian--an intelligent cobbler (Pl. Alcib.1.125a). Also phronesis.
See Urmson, J. The Greek Philosophical Volcabulary. Peters, F. E. Greek Philosophical Terms, A
Historical Lexicon.
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.55 Spoudaics. For Aristotle, spoudaios, or noble character is contrasted with phaulos, base and
sophistic behavior. Poetics. Dictionary of Classical and Medieval Literary Criticism. 1974:104
See also Kathekontics, from kathekonta “appropriate actions.” Zeno of Citium appears to have
used this term to define virtuous actions that result from a perfectly rational mental disposition and thus
exhibit the highest degree of consistency. Zeyl. Ency Class Phil: 578-9
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.5 Aporetics literally, absence of a way through, not knowing what to do. Urmson, J. The Greek
Philosophical Volcabulary
In 1546 Rabelais made Gargantua remark, in the Tiers Livre, that "[...] now the most learned and
most prudent philosophers are not ashamed to be seen entering in at the porches and frontispieces of
the schools of the Pyrrhonian, Aporrethic, Sceptic, and the Ephetic sects." Rabelais himself mocked a
skeptical dialogue between Panurge and Trouillogan, using technical expressions belonging to the
Pyrrhonian tradition like "Tous le deux", "Tous le deux ensemblement", "Ne l'une ne l'aultre", "Il y a de
l'apparence", and "Ne lun ne l'aultre, et tous les deux ensemble".
See Doxastics: When someone says that they believe something, they mean that they have
access to a body of evidence from which it can be derived. Where they get their evidence from, what
sorts of derivation they are prepared to perform, will vary from person to person. We can denote the fact
that agent A believes proposition P by [[private ([A])=>P]]. That is, when someone says that they believe
something, they mean that they have access to a body of evidence from which it can be derived. Where
they get their evidence from, what sorts of derivation they are prepared to perform, will vary from person
to person. Allan Ramsay. “Why Stick to Doxastic Logic?” Dynamic and Underspecified Interpretation
without Dynamic or Underspecified Logic 1996
See Eulogonics (probablism)
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.45 Ephetics error or dubeity which is assertoric and may require suspension of judgment. In valid
deductive reasoning, the conclusion necessarily follows the premises, such that the conjunction of the
premises with a negation of the conclusion yields a contradiction. In contrast, an invalid deductive
argument is one where the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises, such that it is
logically possible (i.e. not contradictory) for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.
Ephete, ephetae: a member of an ancient Athenian court that tried certain murder
cases--compare Areopagite. Webster’sThird International.
"To check, hold back, hence to suspend (one's judgement)." From Greek. "Characterized by a
suspense of judgement. In ancient use, a distinctive epithet of the Sceptic school of philosophers."1693:
Urquhart, Rabelais: "The Schools of the Pyrrronian…Sceptick, and
Ephectick sects." 1883: Saintsbury in Daily News, 20 Dec: "Montaigne's attitude was
ephectic." OED
Dubeity is a mode of cultural tale-telling that is neurotically conscious of its own self-censoring
apparatus." Sara Suleri. The Rhetoric of English India (1992): 3.
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.40 Eristics [willful falsehoods, proven, from logomachies to supernumerary deontics] Eristics is the art
of sophistry, or the sum total of devices which prove or refute any statement with equal success. Aristotle
makes no difference between Eristics and sophistry.
“If the Eristic sees a phony puzzle, his pleasure is to drag words this way and that, but the
argument will prove to him that he is not making a worthy use of his faculties. For there is no charm in
such puzzles, and there is no real difficulty in them, but we can tell him of something else in the pursuit
of which there is great charm and also a difficulty”. Plato. Sophist, 259.
“You would not confuse the principle and the consequences in your reasoning, like the Eristics.”
Phaedo, 101.
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.35 Philosophastics Philosophast: OED: philosophaster: A shallow or pseudo-philosopher, a smatterer
or pretender in philosophy. 1611. Florio, “Philosophasto” a smatterer in philosophy, a foolish pedanticall
philosophaster.
Catherine Elgin. The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity Synthese 74, 297`311. 1988 Stupid people
may be in a better position to know than smart ones. Our epistemic goal is to accept as many truths as
possible combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else
scepticism will prevail. Knowledge, as contemporary theories construe it, is not a particularly valuable
cognitive achievement, and that we would do well to reopen epistemology to the study of cognitive
excellences of all sorts.
"Ignorance is bliss." Lucien Jerphagnon. Platon et les Elithioi. Rev Metaph Morale. 76, 25-31.
1971. Why are there so many imbeciles (elithioi) in the early dialogues? Hippias, Ion, Eutyphron, Laches,
Nicias, etc know a great deal but are unable to understand the basic rules of ousia, the foundation of
science and morals. The elithioi are only able to enumerate and never gets any further. It may be that
Plato wished to warn against a conjuration of imbeciles responsible for the death of Socrates. It should
be noted that the elithioi are all strangers to the Mysteries.
In ancient comedy the most frequently takes the form of a miles gloriosus or a pedant.
Pangloss, professor of metaphysical-theo-cosmo-idiotology, Alazon: A deceiving or self-deceived
character in fiction, normally an object of ridicule in comedy or satire, but often the hero of a tragedy.
Abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva (horsesense philosopher uninspired by Minerva). Horace Satires.
Bozone (n.) The substance surrounding stupid people that stops bright ideas from penetrating.
The bozone layer, unfortunately, shows little sign of breaking down in the near future. Dopelar effect (n.)
The tendency of stupid ideas to seem smarter when you come at them rapidly. Also: assotism,
cyclopedantics (whirling drivilism), phrontisterics, dontopedology, Stupidastics, LOGOPANDOCY, The
Journal of Vain Erudition, Morioduction, moriology (from Pierre Pathelin), moronomostliast(ics),
philofoppery, blindlight foolosophy, assininity, ratiomuffinism, dummyaboutics,"The Wise Men of
Gotham"
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.30 Sciolistics 1816: pretentious superficiality of knowledge. Sciolist: one who has a smattering of
knowledge. Also, sciosophics: pretended knowledge of natural or supernatural forces systematized by
tradition or imaginative invention. Webster’s Third International.
Sciosophy: any system of thought founded on beliefs which are at variance with contemporary
scientific knowledge and resistant to the procedures of scientific method. Funk and Wagnalls’ Standard
Dictionary 1965.
See Theophrastus description of Diogenes of Apollonia as “confusionism” Zeyl Ency Class. Phil.
188: for pneumatic theory? belief in an infinite number of worlds [other universes]? Routledge Ency Phil
III: 88
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.25 Thaumaturgics [miracles, and the suspension of normal physics for "spirit" without materialism
According to Aristotle’s analysis (Meta. 982b), philosophy begins with a sense of wonder
(thauma, Aristotle makes the point here that philosophy and mythology share wonder as a common point
of departure) growing from an initial difficulty (aporia). This is paralleled in Socrates’ frequent
protestations of his own ignorance (e.g. Meno, 8od, soph.244a).
But this intial state of ignorance, compared by Aristotle to a man in chains (Meta. 995a32), yields
to a further sense where aporia, or more specifically, diaporia, an exploration of various routes, assumes
the features of a dialectical process (Meta. 995-1-gb, see dialektike), and where the investigation of the
opinions (endoxa, 1.v)of one’s philosophical predecessors is a necessary preliminary to arriving at a
proof. Thus, the aporiai are posed, previous opinions on thes problems are canvassed, and a solution
(euporia, lysis) is worked out validating the endoxa. Peters, F. E. Greek Philosophical Terms, A Historical
Lexicon. ]
“Thyrsics” thyrsus, thyrsi, the Baccante staff with grapes or berries: “Many are the
thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics” Phaedo, 69.
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.20 Anagogics [hermetics, or mystical intuition] interpretation of a word, passage, or text (as of Scripture
or poetry) that finds beyond the literal, allegorical, and moral senses a fourth and ultimate spiritual or
mystical sense. Anagogic interpretation as the most profound symbol of the divine world. “Anagogicus
sensus dicitur qui a visibilibus tendit ad invisibilia, ut lux primo die facta...naturam angelicam significat.”
Hughes de Saint-Victor in Auber. Symbolisme religieux, II, 53. Anagogic: Relating to literature as a total
order of words, statement of hypothetical identity (anagogic metaphor).
Richard of St Victor’s contemplative writings profoundly influenced Bonaventure’s Journey of the
MInd into God and Dante’s Comedy. Bonaventure designates Richard (with Pseudo-Dionysius) as the
exemplar of ‘anagogic’ or mystical theology. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1998 VIII:313
Llullian reading [Ramon Llull, Sp. 1232-1316] 1. Llull [pron. chluy] recommended a form of
reading that transcended the literal meanings of the text and led the reader to the highest (anagogical)
levels of experience. 2. A series of steps: first, to read in normal order, second, to skip about at random,
third, to read only the chapter headings, finally, to read the entire work mentally, without the text present.
Donald Kunze. Lexicon. Copyright © 1996
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.15 Paralogics [abnormal psychology] Paraphron(ics): mad, insane, distraught. Donald Borror. Word
Roots and Combining Forms. 1971: 70
Paralogia: a reasoning disorder characterized by inappropriate resonses to questioning and
based on underlying autistic or dereistic processes (as in schizophrenia). Paralogism: a reasoning
contrary to logical rules or formulas, a fallacy of arguing from the empty concept of the ego to its
substantiality and eternality. Paralogist: one who uses reasoning that begs the questions, Paralogizse: to
reason falsely or draw conclusions not warranted by the premises. Webster’s Third International.
Paralogy subscribes to the idea that it is impossible to codify a procedure that will predict the
path of understanding for another. It is "beyond logic" and " accounts for the attrib
Author: Ian C. Dengler (cargan[ at ]delrio.com)
Date: Apr 21, 1999REPLY: "Theory of Theory" "Taxonomy of All Possible Worlds" "Theory of Everything" "Taxonomy of Metatheories" "Theory of Logic"
Author: Anonymous
Date: Jul 19, 1999REPLY: Revision in Previous Alpha-taxonomy
1.00 [apophantics: rule itself]
.95 [apodeictics: inorganic chemistry]
.90 [aisthesics: Bacteria, Archaea to..?]
.85 [eikasics: instinct driven systems, Lophotrochozoans?]
.80 [proegmenics: choice as in Ecdysozoans/Insects? ]
.75 [prohairetics: choice as in middle order Deuterostomes/vertebrates?]
.70 [pithanotics: higher order mammels?]
.65 [hypolepsics: primates?]
.60 [phronimics: homo sapiens sapiens?]
.55 [spoudaics: Humanism]
.50 [aporetics: probable opinion]
.45 [ephetics: dubious opinion]
.40 [eristics: pedants, busybodies, agitprops and tyrants]
.35 [philosophastics: flim-flam, nostrums and alternative medicine]
.30 [sciolistics: alternative physics of vampires and U.F.O.s]
.25 [thaumaturgics: unrestricted alternative physics of miracles]
.20 [anagogics: mysticism]
.15 [paralogics: abnormal psychology]
.10 [paleophrenics: insanity]
.05 [acataleptics: coma and death]
.00 [apophasics: dissolution and null states.]
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