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ANNOTATION:
Meme Definition Far Too Restrictive

This is the first sentence of the Memlex defn for 'meme': "A contagious information pattern that replicates by parasitically infecting human minds and altering their behavior, causing them to propagate the pattern."

Why stipulate that a meme changes behaviour? We have no trouble with accepting neutral genes, so why not neutral memes? The meme "David Letterman has bad hair" is not at all likely to change my behaviour.

In particular, there is no reason to declare that a meme changes behaviour in such a way as to cause its own replication. This is merely one way in which a meme can be SUCCESSFUL. In general, we could only say that the ENTIRE set of memes inhabiting a mind, acting together, will, if successful, cause some subset of those memes to be replicated. Actually, even this is too restrictive, as fecundity is only one means of being successful. Longevity is also important.

In view of these criticisms, it seems unreasonable to say that a pattern can't be considered a meme until it has been transmitted. Some memes (what I would call memes) are, by their nature unlikely to be transmitted. Where you would not grant them meme-hood, I would merely say that they are not likely to be SUCCESSFUL memes.

Here is a proposal for a much less leading defn of meme, more in keeping (I feel) with Dawkins' original intention:

"An information pattern that can inhabit minds, and may potentially be transmitted from mind to mind."

As a general rule, I believe that definitions should only describe the absolute essentials. For example, we would not now like to see a defn of 'mind' that stipulated a human brain as the hardware. By paring down defns to the bare minimum, we avoid prejudicing the direction taken in an exciting new field.

Excuse the verbosity.

Lee Borkman
School of Philosophy
Uni of New South Wales
Australia.


Author: Bill Warren (celtman[ at ]prairienet.org)
Date: Dec 23, 1998

REPLY: mental space

I am troubled by the concept of ideas inhabiting an "idea
space" mental substance. Could such talk about the host be
translated into Feynmanlike analyses of the physical costs-
entropy? to the neuronal hardware of the information processing
 processes involved in the meme "software" replication?


Author: Bill Warren (celtman[ at ]prairienet.org)
Date: Dec 23, 1998

REPLY: mental space

I am troubled by the concept of ideas inhabiting an "idea
space" mental substance. Could such talk about the host be
translated into Feynmanlike analyses of the physical costs-
entropy? to the neuronal hardware of the information processing
processes involved in the meme "software" replication?


Author: Bill Warren (celtman[ at ]prairienet.org)
Date: Dec 23, 1998

REPLY: mental space

I am troubled by the concept of ideas inhabiting an "idea
space" mental substance. Could such talk about the host be
translated into Feynmanlike analyses of the physical costs-
entropy? to the neuronal hardware of the information processing
processes involved in the meme "software" replication?


Author: Bill Warren (celtman[ at ]prairienet.org)
Date: Dec 23, 1998

REPLY: mental space

I am troubled by the concept of ideas inhabiting an "idea
space" mental substance. Could such talk about the host be
translated into Feynmanlike analyses of the physical costs-
entropy? to the neuronal hardware of the information processing
processes involved in the meme "software" replication?


Author: Wesley West (imaginati[ at ]peoplepc.com)
Date: Jan 21, 2003

REPLY: Thought is behavior

In reference to the concern about the use of "behavior" in the definition. I would say that it should stand. This is one of the common problems that is addressed in psychology and cognitive neuroscience. That is the idea that "behavior" is frequently confused with "observable behavior". It is important to recognize that mental activity is a class of behavior. The example meme of "David Letterman has bad hair" does change the behavior of a host. When the individual sees David Letterman, he is likely to think, "David Letterman has bad hair". That thought is a behavior. More subtly, the individual could simply find David Letterman unattractive or annoying for a reason that they cannot specify. This mental behavior is rooted in the bad hair meme.


Copyright© 1995 Principia Cybernetica - Referencing this page

Author
Lee Borkman (leeb[ at ]kralizec.zeta.org.au)

Date
Feb 23, 1995

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