If the hypothetical zombie
behaves in all respects indistinguishably from
a person with consciousness, then the
principle of the identity of the
indistinguishables would force us to conclude
that the "zombie" has consciousness. How
else would we know that the people around
us aren't zombies?
The 'dentity of indiscernables'is insufficient in this case. The
whole point of the hard problem of consciousness is that it
involves different perspectives/views/experiences, so it is important
to whom the things are indiscernable. Just because I can not tell apart
twin sisters does not mean they are the same. If you are saying that
the indistinguishabioity is from some omniscient third-person view
then, yes, you could carry through this arguement to say 'zombies can't
exist'. But the introduction of this view introduces an assumption which
simply negates the primacy of the first-person view.
It is my view that the real reason why zombies are an absurdity to us
is that our self-consciousness is based on the use of our model
of others as a basis for building our self (and vice versa) so that
our very self and our model of others co-develop. This is the
foundation of our social empathy, on e we can not deny without
threatening the foundations of our own experience. (see http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/cpmrep58.html).
This does not mean that I disagree with the general drift of this
page, but the 'quick-fix' identity of indescernables argument
is insufficient (as is, I expect every other 'proof').
Author: Francis Heylighen
Date: Sep 15, 2000REPLY:
The identity of the indistinguishables does not apply to any particular third person view, but to all possible views. If no one from any point of view using whatever means of observation or testing can distinguish between a zombie and a person with consciousness, then I believe there is no difference. Since we assume by default that people behaving as if they are conscious also do have consciousness, "zombies" therefore cannot exist.
I agree with Bruce's further point about self-consciousness developing through other consciousness, but the "hard problem" does not care about something as sophisticated as self-consciousness: it only cares about raw, personal experience, and that is something you already find in animals.
